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Media coverage and public discussion of the coronavirus crisis has focussed 
primarily on what states and governments do and what they should do about it: 
about the relationship between epidemiology and policies. Within the global 
North at least, public health is seen as being ultimately the responsibility of the 
state, despite neoliberal strategies aiming to dodge this responsibility and a 
legacy of hollowing out and privatising public health.  
This arises from a history of state responsibility for public health going back (in 
Europe) a century and a half, itself in part the product of the appalling results of 
poverty and pollution in the new industrial towns, incarnated in the provision of 
sewers and drinking water. If public drinking fountains are now mostly shut to 
facilitate the selling of bottled water, the wider legacy is not easily shifted, 
despite decades of attempts to place the responsibility onto individuals as 
“consumers” (most commonly, of privatised health care that benefits from 
various forms of public subsidy).  
Writing this on the Easter weekend, traditionally a period for family holidays in 
much of Europe, the latest iteration of European neoliberalism is the attempt to 
weaponise finger-wagging about individual behaviour, to convert handling the 
crisis into a matter of policing one another; but even here the finger-wagging is 
mostly shaped in terms of pressurising your neighbours to do what the 
government has told them to do. The first and easiest form of social movement 
action, then, has been to pressure the state to take on its own responsibilities. 
 
Forcing states to act 
In many countries, civil society has been crucial in forcing states to actually bite 
the bullet and do something – challenging deep-seated tendencies of drawing a 
veil over embarrassing failures, of fear of “panic”, of concern for the national 
image, of boosting investor and consumer confidence of keeping the economy 
going at all costs, of not wanting to spend money… All the instinctual reactions 
of PR-oriented managers came into play at governmental level, and needed to 
be overcome. 
While liberals like the easy and reassuring story of “science speaks and 
governments (should) listen”, a more accurate account of the last few months 
would be “civil society shouts, states decide they have to do something and then 
turn to scientists of their choosing”. In China, medics had to become 
whistleblowers for the state to admit there was a problem. States like Iran and 
Myanmar similarly denied the facts until it was impossible to continue doing so. 
In Britain (according to a Nov 2019 WEF report the world’s second-best 
prepared country for a pandemic, after the USA), it took a public outcry for the 
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government to admit that its “scientific advice” was wrong – while court 
reporters now deny that “herd immunity” was ever part of its thinking. In this 
bizarre model, 60% (in fact herd immunity can require 70 or 80% of a 
population to be infected, and relies on immunity being acquired – which was 
not certain at the time) of the population of the UK (perhaps 42 million people) 
would catch the virus. On the death rates then reported from China or Italy, this 
could have meant half a million deaths in a matter of months – something 
which the official scientists failed to notice because they used mortality rates for 
viral pneumonia instead. It took a lot of pressure for the government and its 
scientists to take on board what the rest of the world was telling them. 
In Ireland – which remains at the mercy of the control experiment being 
conducted next door – the state took a fortnight to catch up with civil society in 
terms of public demands for action. A weak caretaker government, badly 
defeated in an election, eventually put itself at the head of the parade. Unable to 
act without popular consensus, it nevertheless benefitted strongly from this 
feeling of a national community of feeling – while making exceptions for the 
building industry (construction sites were only closed very belatedly) and their 
rich and well-connected friends who returned from the Cheltenham races in the 
middle of the crisis.  
As states now move to restore “normality” – with varying mixes of actual 
success in tackling the virus as against pressure from economic interests – 
movements can be expected to do what they can to contest unsafe processes of 
capitalist restoration where the health response has been thoroughly 
inadequate. 
 
Contesting how the state acts 
A second way that movements act on this crisis – having helped to push the 
state into action – is around the specifics of what it does. The state naturally 
takes a “bird’s eye” perspective that misses the local rationalities that people 
actually live by and in – even before we talk about the state in capitalism, the 
interests it routinely takes into account (those of the wealthy, the powerful and 
the culturally privileged) and the needs it routinely ignores.  
Renters are a classic example here. But this is also true for people in precarious 
work (often overlooked by state rescue packages), prisoners, refugees, homeless 
people, students in campus accommodation - and groups like people with 
disabilities, health workers, people in care homes and others who a top-down 
medical view really should see but often ... doesn't.  
As has become clear, care homes have been in effect treated as waiting rooms 
for death by governments in several countries – and in some not even included 
in national statistics of coronavirus deaths. People with disabilities have 
particularly complex and constrained lives which are often ignored in general 
rules for what people are allowed to do in a crisis, and fall foul of the arbitrary 
policing that has been widespread in “lockdowns”. 
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This policing more generally has exposed those who are normally shielded from 
it to the banal stupidity of everyday policing, and led to a certain degree of 
backlash, in some cases successful, against police forces rewriting the law – or at 
times even government recommendations – into forms that make sense to local 
police culture.  
In many countries, we have seen increasing agitation and whistleblowing by 
health workers who are offered national cheerleading support but often 
deprived of PPE (personal protective equipment) and in extreme cases even 
disciplined for using their own. In Italy, the closure of workplaces was forced by 
workers in non-essential factories repeatedly going on strike; in Dublin, bus 
drivers refused to accept fares after management disciplined a driver for 
allowing passengers on through the side doors.  
In Ireland, a particular battle has been around asylum seekers in “direct 
provision” (at the mercy of private landlords paid by the state) who have been 
left in over-crowded accommodation, sharing rooms with strangers and 
notionally “self-isolating” in rows of beds. Despite massive numbers of empty 
hotel rooms and the collapse of Airbnb, the government has refused to do more 
than move a cosmetic number from one shared accommodation to another. Led 
by MASI, the Movement of Asylum Seekers in Ireland, activists have been 
pushing the government hard on this issue. 
Social movements, then, have often been central in pushing the state to take 
action at all – and have then had to push again to get it to act in ways that take 
social realities other than those of the wealthy, powerful and culturally 
privileged into account. This experience has been shaped differently in different 
countries, with social media, unions, NGOs, left politicians and individual 
activists all involved. 
Of course they are not the only actors involved: they find allies among academic 
and media voices, people aware of the situation in other countries, sections of 
the public that have become increasingly worried by governments unwilling to 
act, acting ineptly or acting cruelly are all part of the picture, and some fractions 
of capital that are thinking beyond the short term. 
 
Solidarity economy and mutual aid 
And then … we have countries where the state is doing its very best not to act, 
for whatever reason: ideological blinkers, debts owed to very short-term capital 
interests for buying elections, sheer incompetence and so on, where the general 
strategy can be summed up as “bail out the banks and call out the army”. The 
incapacity of the American federal government to respond coherently to the 
crisis speaks volumes about its declining hegemony within its own borders as 
well as internationally; Sweden is a more surprising case. 
In majority world countries, the state lacks this capacity for other reasons, while 
the scale of the informal economy, the nature of the shanty-town environment, 
the weakness of health systems etc. mean that the kinds of responses to the 
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virus explored in most of the global North are either not feasible or not effective. 
In both kinds of context, we are seeing a huge upsurge in various forms of 
solidarity economy and mutual aid, people coming together to look after each 
other directly, beyond what the state can or will do.  
On the fringes of popular self-organising we also see acts of responsibility by 
some employers, some universities, a handful of landlords etc. going above and 
beyond what the state mandates in different countries; but it is above all those 
who are on the edge, who are more used to giving and asking for help as part of 
their daily survival, who are helping to keep everyone afloat.  
This is only partly a response to “objective circumstances” or the needs of “bare 
life”, which do not automatically translate into collective solidarity but can be 
shaped in other and much more damaging ways (clientelism, communalism, 
gang structures etc.) The contrast between the disaster that is the Indian 
situation and the level of popular self-organising visible in South Africa is one 
obvious indicator of this: self-organising traditions do not always survive over 
time to be re-activated in times of crisis.  
South African poors (and US communities in struggle) have a long and recent 
history of acting collectively around basic needs which is not universal: people 
can of course rediscover what is after all an ordinary way of being human, but it 
is not always easy to do so at short notice. Many majority world and southern 
European countries have effective traditions of solidarity economy constructed 
in the long recession from 2007-8 as the welfare or developmentalist state has 
withdrawn even further from people’s lives.  
In a sense the growth of solidarity economy reverses the historical development 
of welfare states in the global North, where the new urban proletariat initially 
looked for ways of supporting each other - unions, mutual insurance against 
injury or sickness etc., credit unions, self-organised education etc. - and states 
often took over these tasks. 
In Ireland, although the state is far more effective (doing significantly better 
than the UK, for example), there are powerful cultures of active communities 
that range from the recent experiences of struggle around abortion, gay 
marriage and water commodification to less contentious forms of a nonetheless 
powerful imagined community. Long popular traditions of self-organising on a 
charity model have developed in the crisis, ranging from “checking in on 
neighbours” to ensuring supplies are available for marginalised groups (e.g. 
masks for asylum-seekers in “direct provision”). The net effect is that mutual aid 
groups of many different kinds – overtly politicised and “normalised” alike – 
have flourished as an unremarkable response to immediate suffering. 
These processes develop new kinds of “local rationality” – ways of coping that 
people come to rely on – or extend existing ones. These local rationalities can 
readily come into conflict with state interventions, landlords’ or employers’ 
demands, etc., or indeed be perceived as challenges. They also create new bases 
for organising around longer-term needs and broader demands. 
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New forms of struggle 
As always, new situations give rise to new forms of struggle. Italy like other 
countries has seen prisoner revolts against overcrowded prisons in times of 
virus, and there have been some innovative forms of outside support (involving 
driving around the prisons in cars, hence physically distancing) in the US. Italy 
(again) saw the first (contested) public funeral, of lifelong activist Salvatore 
Ricciardi, followed by a memorial wall slogan being painted – in the teeth of the 
police. 
Amazon and other logistics workers suddenly find themselves working in very 
unsafe situations, which were already extremely oppressive and poorly paid, but 
now are life-threatening and simultaneously absolutely necessary for everyone 
else, meaning that workers have more power. Union organising and strikes will 
tend to develop in these key industries, initially around virus-related issues but 
no doubt over time around pay, conditions and managerial power. 
Calls for rent strikes have been spreading, particularly but not only in the US 
where moratoria on evictions have been patchy, unemployed workers are even 
less likely to find adequate support than in other Northern countries – and the 
lack of state intervention means that the crisis is particularly severe in other 
ways. 
In Ireland, the older struggle – before the virus – was around soaring rental 
prices in particular, brought on by a failure of social housing provision, vulture 
fund investment in short-term (e.g. student) housing, Airbnb, and more 
generally the financialisation of housing markets. While this had failed to 
produce a mass movement (in part because of the huge range of people’s 
housing relationships) it nonetheless produced mass anger which expressed 
itself in historically high votes for left parties in the last general election and 
difficulties in government formation. However there are good chances that the 
virus in itself will burst the housing bubble and defuse at least some of this 
pressure; and that the “next big movement” in Ireland will be something 
currently unexpected. 
We will see many, many more struggles before this is through. 
 
The possibility of a better world? 
Putting all this in the terms Alf and I outlined in We Make Our Own History: 
Marxism and Social Movements in the Twilight of Neoliberalism, social 
movements start from human needs and our everyday praxis, which already 
exists but is massively variable. People find themselves in specific situations 
shaped by inequality, power and cultural hierarchies, and (collectively, 
culturally) develop ways of trying to cope - "local rationalities". 
When (as with the virus) these are disrupted, threatened or undermined, people 
mobilise through and to defend them in quite specific ways - what Raymond 
Williams called "militant particularisms". These are different for renters, 
prisoners, refugees, precarious workers, healthcare workers and so on – and 
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different in different countries. However if multiple such particularisms come 
together (for example, in demands on the state from similar groups across a 
country, or from multiple groups around related issues like housing or pay) you 
can get a campaign. 
Of course people were already in many cases mobilised before the virus - and 
those groups will be among those most active in developing new forms of 
mutual aid, new kinds of struggle, making links, pushing the state etc. Bring 
enough "campaigns" around specific issues together - and we start to see the 
embryo of a "social movement project", the vision of an alternative kind of 
society which is shaped around the needs of the powerless, the poor and the 
culturally despised. 
And sometimes, when the dominant strategy for accumulating capital was 
already struggling to keep the show on the road, this kind of "movement of 
movements" can create an organic crisis. After all, we have been in the “twilight 
of neoliberalism” for some time… 
 
Against magical thinking 
There is a big “but” here, though. A lot of writing currently popular on the left 
seeks to move from the virus to a better world without going through the messy 
business of popular struggles and collective debates: to resolve on paper (in the 
form of a saleable intellectual commodity) what actually needs to be resolved in 
contentious human practice.  
Thus, for example, it is patently not true that things getting worse in itself 
creates a crisis that is likely to have a better outcome, however “objective” the 
need might seem. Anyone who paid attention in 2007-8 will have noticed this. 
Similarly, just because the utopia conjured up on paper seems compelling to its 
author (or well-grounded in “the literature”, or whatever else), this is no 
guarantee that it will actually happen.  
Reality perpetually refuses to allow individuals, or small self-selected publics, to 
inscribe their own self-image or wished-for future on the map of the world: 
between the idea and the outcome falls the shadow of power, underpinned by 
organised interests and buttressed by ideology (or, put another way, consent 
armoured by coercion). Unless these social relationships change, they can be 
relied on to reassert “normality” with incredible force at the end of any given 
crisis, just as the beautiful visions of the European anti-fascist resistance were 
largely squeezed out under the pressures of Cold War and the restoration of 
capitalism in the west and Soviet power in the East.    
“We need”, “we must”, “we are finally realising” and all these rhetorical phrases 
are good for selling text by the yard to people who want to consume sermons; 
unless they are effective agitation – speaking directly to the needs, struggles 
and questions of large numbers of people – they are condemned to act as 
substitutes for the actual process of change. 
So what is the relationship between crisis and transformation? 
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Rethinking the war metaphor 
One particularly powerful form of magical thinking is the belief that there is 
some hidden historical logic that will automatically and necessarily produce 
good effects. Gramsci felt that this kind of fatalism – “I have been defeated for 
the moment, but the tide of history is working for me in the long term” – was 
suited to giving movements strength in periods of defeat when they did not have 
the initiative, but became a real danger in moments of crisis when subaltern 
groups develop an active subjectivity and become leading actors.  
The contemporary form of this fatalism lies in a lazy reading of history which 
sees wars as somehow automatically producing positive effects – British 
examples are the granting of votes for women after WWI and the development 
of the welfare state after WWII. Akin to theories of wars as engines of technical 
progress, this account erases the agency of first-wave feminists and inter-war 
socialist and trade union organising – in part because those who repeat it have 
known far more elite agency than they have effective, organised popular 
struggle. 
The metaphor of war for societies’ responses to the coronavirus has been 
widespread, and justly criticised for its inappropriateness to the actual measures 
involved and its centring of (male) leader figures in a story which (following not 
actual wars but recent war movies) the performance of masculinity is somehow 
what brings victory against all the odds – a theory which was mown down by 
machine guns on the Western Front over a hundred years ago but is oddly 
appealing to certain people. 
However (as with the “war brings good things” theory) there is a half-truth 
partly obscured by the verbiage. Like wars, the virus has combined non-routine 
forms of state action with significant degrees of popular mobilisation: while 
most attention has gone (as always) to the state, historical experience suggests 
that it is the popular mobilisation that is most important. Lenin – who knew 
what he was talking about in this respect – had some interesting things to say 
on the subject, in 1915: 
 
To the Marxist it is indisputable that a revolution is impossible without a 
revolutionary situation; furthermore, it is not every revolutionary situation that 
leads to revolution. What, generally speaking, are the symptoms of a 
revolutionary situation? We shall certainly not be mistaken if we indicate the 
following three major symptoms: (1) when it is impossible for the ruling classes to 
maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or 
another, among the “upper classes”, a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, 
leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the 
oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually 
insufficient for “the lower classes not to want” to live in the old   way; it is also 
necessary that “the upper classes should be unable” to live in the old way; (2) 
when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than 
usual; (3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable 
increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to 
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be robbed in “peace time”, but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the 
circumstances of the crisis and by the “upper classes” themselves into 
independent historical action.  
 
Failures of rule 
Taken on its own terms, this describes the conditions for a revolutionary 
situation, which is no guarantee of a revolutionary outcome. The late Colin 
Barker, as a leading scholar of revolutions, was fond of this analysis. Its first 
element, in Colin’s gloss, is the rulers no longer being able to carry on ruling as 
they had done. 
Lenin was thinking ahead in the context of WWI, but also of the Russian defeat 
in the Russo-Japanese war, which helped lead to the 1905 revolution, and 
probably above all of the Paris Commune. In 1870 the French empire had 
manifestly failed at the basic business of empiring, by starting and badly losing a 
war with the Prussians. Paris had suffered a siege and the Versaillais added 
insult to injury by seeking to remove cannons paid for by popular subscription.  
So one element of this is the ruling classes failing in something that is core to 
the business of “ruling” – as we have seen, public health is historically this, and 
doubly so once the state takes on the role of leading the “war” on the virus. The 
central issue will be how far people actually feel that states (and employers, 
landlords, private health care systems etc.) are looking after them or not in this 
crisis. 
Any fool can make a sonorous speech; but can they actually carry out the tasks 
that follow from the pontificating? Johnson and Trump have clearly failed (to 
our eyes); but will this be clear to their voters? 
Centrists, by contrast, are oddly happy to have this kind of crisis, because they 
like managing things. In Ireland, as noted, Varadkar has found himself – and 
his party – a new lease of life in the face of the crisis. 
The difficulty for centrists is that tackling the virus involves large-scale 
investment, and health care systems which have been often systematically run 
down for decades. Will they be up to the task? 
So far, the indications are that despite their very different systems, the states in 
China, South Korea and Italy are largely receiving popular support, well into the 
crisis. Iran, perhaps not. How England / Wales and the US fare may be a 
different question again. 
 
A crisis of local rationalities 
Clearly states that fail in their front-line response to the virus, in whatever way, 
will be made to pay for it. But I suspect greater weaknesses will show 
everywhere else, as the (necessary) response disrupts everyday life massively 
and people's needs aren't seen or met. The social dimension of life under 
extended curfew, rationing, isolation etc. with loss of jobs, housing, family 
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connections etc.... not all states will see this, or deal with it well. And what's the 
betting that the reconstruction will pay far more attention to the needs of 
business and banking than to the "heroes" and "heroines" who have been 
praised by official rhetoric and made the real sacrifices? 
Lenin’s second dimension is that the local rationalities of the “oppressed 
classes” are under even more pressure than usual – or, as Colin put it, people 
are no longer willing to go on being governed as they have been. 
Resistance to WWI started (with India’s Ghadar and Ireland’s Easter Rising) in 
1915 and 1916 in an effective way, but by the end of the war armies and navies 
were mutinying across Europe, strikes were building and peasants were 
occupying the land. The Russian Revolution comes at the midpoint of this 
process. 
The end of the war - with bitter winters, Spanish flu, food shortages, 
unemployment etc. - saw revolutionary waves develop even further. Four 
empires (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Russia) fell in these years, and the 
British Empire lost much of Ireland. This was the period in which the nation-
state became the wave of the future; but there is nothing automatic about the 
process. Starting in Italy, fascism rolled back most of those revolutions. 
 
“Independent historical action” 
A key part of all this is Lenin's third point, about "independent historical 
action". States mobilised people into war - not just into militaries, but in the 
fields and factories, through rationing and a thousand other transformations of 
daily life. People had been told "we are in this together against the common 
enemy", "you must make these sacrifices for the common goal", and "you are an 
actor on the stage of history". Many people took this rhetoric seriously at first 
(as today’s liberal pundits still do). 
But the most important thing is that people had learned to become public 
actors, initially mobilised and transforming daily life behind someone else's 
leadership. The more the war went on, the more their own and their families’ 
needs went unmet, the more critical people were of the leadership – and the 
more they started to mobilise on their own behalf. 
This is the critical moment: in 1916-23 as in 1870-1, top-down mobilisation for 
the state's goals gave way to bottom-up mobilisation for ordinary people's own 
needs. Workers seized factories. Peasants seized the land. Soldiers and sailors 
mutinied for an end to the war and to go back home. Oppressed nationalities 
sought independence. 
Of course we aren't in 1914, or 1870, and right now the crisis is immediate. 
Unlike 1914, no sane person would want to stop states responding to the crisis - 
mostly we have wanted them firstly to step in and secondly to do it well. But that 
doesn't mean all those other issues are gone - they can't be avoided. States are 
choosing who to support and how - as landlords or renters, as businesses or 
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workers, and in a million other ways. They will take our needs more or less on 
board in different countries. 
And there are already so many pieces of unfinished business. 
Now that people have seen how much can be done - how many things we were 
told were impossible but are actually entirely doable with the political will - they 
may not be happy to wait for ever. They may see some other things as also being 
important enough to act on even if it doesn't fit the economists' theologies. 
However it takes time to get to this point, because the crisis is largely 
constituted by what millions, and today tens of millions, of people do and think. 
Lenin continued (and remember, this is only 1915): 
 
It was generally known, seen and admitted that a European war would be more 
severe than any war in the past. This is being borne out in ever greater measure 
by the experience of the war. The conflagration is spreading; the political 
foundations of Europe are being shaken more and more; the sufferings of the 
masses are appalling, the efforts of governments, the bourgeoisie and the 
opportunists to hush up these sufferings proving ever more futile. The war profits 
being obtained by certain groups of capitalists are monstrously high, and 
contradictions are growing extremely acute. The smouldering indignation of the 
masses, the vague yearning of society’s downtrodden and ignorant strata for a 
kindly (“democratic”) peace, the beginning of discontent among the “lower 
classes"—all thesc are facts. The longer the war drags on and the more acute it 
becomes, the more the governments themselves foster—and must foster—the 
activity of the masses, whom they call upon to make extraordinary effort 
and  self-sacrifice. The experience of the war, like the experience of any crisis in 
history, of any great calamity and any sudden turn in human life, stuns and 
breaks some people, but enlighten and tempers others. Taken by and large, and 
considering the history of the world as a whole, the number and strength of the 
second kind of people have—with the exception of individual cases of the decline 
and fall of one state or another—proved greater than those of the former kind. 
Far from “immediately” ending all these sufferings and all this enhancement of 
contradictions, the conclusion of peace will, in many respects, make those 
sufferings more keenly and immediately felt by the most backward masses of the 
population. 
 
When I posted the first version of this, on March 18th, I wrote: 
 
“For now, many ppl are still in shock, esp those who haven't had to face these 
kinds of threats and uncertainties before - but also some who are being 
retraumatised. 
Most are struggling to reorganise their ‘local rationalities’ to cope with how their 
specific situation is changing, and to try and meet everyone's needs in that 
situation. 
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And watching what their ‘leaders’ are doing in their name, measuring it in 
different ways.” 
 
And they may decide that having all pulled together, they want to carry on 
pulling together on their own behalf. Meanwhile states and corporations will 
come to make themselves at home in the new normal, and try to use the crisis 
for their own interests, in a thousand different ways. 
However, as people adjust and have time to think - or find themselves in new 
and unresolvable crises - their reactions will change too. Already many, many 
people are going from "object" to "subject", taking action in all sorts of creative 
and unexpected ways for themselves and others. 
It’s also worth remembering that for many, their contribution is driven not by 
fear for themselves, or even for elderly / sick / disabled relatives, but for 
unknown others. That's ... a different and powerful kind of mobilisation. 
 
Finally 
If we used this formula to predict possible outcomes, we would expect to see the 
greatest movement surges come in those countries where (1) the government 
has initially refused to act, and then acted in ways that are widely seen to be 
ineffective and that privilege the interests of capital, of the security state and of 
culturally dominant groups against those of the vast majority; (2) where the 
local rationalities of the majority – as renters and shanty-town dwellers, 
employees and workers in the informal economy, welfare recipients and 
incarcerated people, and a thousand other situations – have been pushed to 
breaking point by the virus and the lockdown; and (3) where “independent 
historical action” – bottom-up self-organisation, social movements – have been 
strongest, before and during the crisis. 
Many societies were shot through with collective struggle before the virus. In the 
current crisis, people have been pushing states to act, and to act better; they 
have been developing new forms of solidarity and trying to change impossible 
situations.  
They won't stop there. Because people don't. 
This future is yet to be written - if the wars of 1870 and 1914 ended in 
revolutions, not every war does. But that history is worth remembering, and 
today's movements are worth supporting, participating in, developing. 
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